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Abstract
Reviewing the development of network access charges in the German electricity
market since 2002 reveals signiﬁcant variation. While some ﬁrms continually in-
creased or decreased their access charges, a variety of ﬁrms exhibited discontinuous
behavior with price changes in both directions. From an economic viewpoint this
price setting turbulence is astonishing because grid operators are non-contestable
natural monopolists, which in this time period were regulated by Negotiated Third
Party Access (NTPA). Depending on the eﬀectiveness or ineﬀectiveness of NTPA,
expected behavior would be either regulated average cost prices or monopoly prices,
but not the observed turbulence. Although in 2005 NTPA scheme was replaced by
a Regulated Third Party Access (RTPA) scheme with a regulator, an analysis of
the factors inﬂuencing the price setting behavior within this period oﬀers valuable
information for the new regulator and the still discussed new incentive regulation,
which is expected to start in 2009. Using multivariate estimations based on ﬁrm
data covering the years 2000-2005, we test the hypotheses that asymmetric inﬂu-
ence of regulatory threat, diﬀerent cost and price calculation knowledge, strategic
use of structural features and the obligation to publish speciﬁc access charges have
inﬂuenced the electricity network access charges in Germany.
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11 The Problem
The German electricity market can be divided into various sections dealing with genera-
tion, transmission networks, distribution networks and retail (Growitsch and Wein 2004)).
The national grid or transmission networks - in Germany an amalgamation of four com-
bined sub-networks (regional closed loop controls, Regelzonen) - is deﬁned as the network
of extra-high-voltage level (220/380 kV). It is used to transmit electricity from the gen-
eration plants to the interconnection sites which link the national grid to the regional
distribution networks. Regional and local distribution is based on high-, medium- and
low-voltage level networks (110, 20, and 0.4 kV). Transmission and distribution networks
are good examples of stages with subadditive cost functions: Density and stochastic scale
advantages necessitate only one network supplier (natural monopoly). Because of the exis-
tence of enormous sunk costs, potential competition cannot work; non-contestable natural
monopolies are a given (Brunekreeft 2002, Growitsch and Wein 2004). In contrast to that,
if non-discriminatory access to both networks stages is provided, the generation and retail
sections will be stages in which competition is possible.
Until the beginning of deregulation in 1998 the German electricity utilities had had
no reason to calculate network access charges. Competition had not occurred, and retail
prices for private households and small businesses had been regulated. By implement-
ing the EU electricity directive (96/92/EC) in 1998 the German legislator opened the
German electricity market to all customers irrespective of size or commercial status and
chose to give access to electricity grids by Negotiated Third Party Access (NTPA). The
negotiations concerning the economic rules for access, and especially the prevention of
monopoly access prices, were the crucial points of NTPA. The network owners and users,
which were represented by several associations, bargained for more than two and one-half
years to develop a contractual framework for the network access (association agreement).
At the end of 2001, the ﬁnal association agreement, the so-called VV II+, was adopted.
It created an obligation to calculate network access charges systematically based on a
catalog of calculation principles for the ﬁrst time for all nine hundred network operators
in Germany. Although, in 2005 NTPA, and therewith the VV II+, was replaced by a
RTPA regime with a regulator, an analysis of the factors inﬂuencing the price setting
behavior within this period oﬀers valuable information for the new regulator and the still
developing incentive regulation, which is expected to be implemented in 2009.
Table 1 represents the comparison of access charges from October 2002 to April 2005.
Surprisingly, against the presumption that the VV II+ agreement and its calculation
principles will cause an overall descent of the access charges, it shows a lot of variation in
the price setting behavior. Whereas more than one-third of all low- and medium-voltage
network owners have not changed their access charges, the other two-thirds have raised
or have lowered their prices. Referring to the high-voltage sector, nearly sixty percent of
the ﬁrms levy charges which are higher in April 2005 than they were in October 2002;
2less than thirty percent work with the same prices.
Table 1: Development of network access charges – 10/2002 to 04/2005
Low-voltage Medium-voltage High-voltage
%
Increasing 23.4 27.9 57.8
Constant 39.9 37.8 28.9
Decreasing 36.8 34.3 13.3
No. of observations 680 641 45
Source: Deregulated German electricity market data set 2006; see chapter 4.
Referring to the development between October 2002 and April 2005, the results are
even more astonishing since it is shown that several operators changed their prices ”in
all directions”. For example, there are numerous operators that started with a relative
high price, then lowered their price, and at the end raised their price again. Therefore, in
order to capture all price changes during October 2002 and April 2005 we calculate the
so-called ”disquietness” within the access charges development. The variable ”disquiet-
ness” represents the average quadratic divergence of the access charges over time:
disquietness =
(valuet − valuet+1)2 + (valuet+1 − valuet+2)2 + ...
number of quadratic diﬀerences
. (1)
Table 2 shows hypothetical, but characteristic, access prices of two low-voltage operators
from October 2002 to May 2005. Whereas both ﬁrms would be registered as price in-
creasing ﬁrms in Table 1, Table 2 shows that Firm 2 changed its prices more often than
Firm 1. Hence, the value of the variable ”disquietness” for Firm 2 is much higher than
value of ”disquietness” of Firm 1.
Table 2: Disquietness – two hypothetical ﬁrms
10/2002 03/2003 10/2003 04/2004 10/2004 04/2005 Disquietness
Firm 1 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91 6.01 0.002
Firm 2 5.91 5.81 5.81 5.85 5.91 6.01 0.00504
Source: Hypothetical ﬁrms, own calculations.
Calculating disquietness for all voltage levels and excluding all ﬁrms with the same
access charges at starting and ending time, we generated Table 3. The descriptive values
show that ﬁrms with decreasing prices changed their prices more often than ﬁrms with
increasing prices and that price changes are relatively high on the low-voltage level, less
3on the medium-voltage and nearly unimportant on the high-voltage level. This result is
given by the average and median values but is not in all cases supported by the standard
deviation.
Table 3: Descriptive values of ”Disquietness”
Low-voltage Medium-voltage High-voltage
Increasing
Mean 0.047 0.029 0.004
Median 0.012 0.005 0.003
Standard deviation 0.129 0.144 0.004
No. of observations 159 179 26
Low-voltage Medium-voltage High-voltage
Decreasing
Mean 0.060 0.034 0.023
Median 0.024 0.007 0.014
Standard deviation 0.147 0.097 0.028
No. of observations 250 220 6
Source: Deregulated German electricity market data set 2006; see chapter 4.
Disquietness, or turbulence, in price setting behavior seems astonishing because, from
the economic viewpoint, grid operators are non-contestable natural monopolists which
during the observed period have been regulated by NTPA. Hence, depending on the eﬀec-
tiveness or ineﬀectiveness of NTPA, the expected observations would be either regulated
average cost prices or monopoly prices, but not the observed turbulence. Furthermore,
because most cost elements of networks are long-run costs, there are very few arguments to
increase prices beyond the starting point of regulation. Nevertheless, the results displayed
in Tables 1 and 3 indicate that in the German electricity market such a stable equilibrium
has not been reached. The question is whether this is just a failure of NTPA that may
be corrected by the new regulatory regime with an incentive-based RTPA scheme or are
there other factors not directly connected to NTPA that may have inﬂuenced the price
setting behavior?
This paper compiles the arguments advanced as to why in many cases the German
network operators did not ﬁnd the optimal price in 2002. The paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 gives a short overview on the German history of NTPA and associ-
ations’ agreements. The theoretical explanations for price changing behavior based on
industrial organization theory are provided in Section 3. Data, empirical hypotheses and
methodology are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains further descriptive analyzes.
4Multivariate estimations results on the signiﬁcance and relevance of the reasons for price
changing behavior are discussed in Section 6. Finally, we summarize our results in Sec-
tion 7.
2 A Short History of NTPA and Associations‘ Agree-
ments
Until April 1998 the German electricity market was characterized by regional operating
monopolies: customers were forced to buy power from one local monopolist; the energy
ﬁrms agreed that no ﬁrm would try to enter the market of another ﬁrm (Deregulierungs-
kommission 1991). Satisfying European obligations, the German legislator opened the
electricity market for all customers in April 1998. This market opening was accomplished
by choosing the option of negotiated third party access (NTPA), which implies a strong
priority for private negotiations between network owners and users. From 1998 until the
end of 2001, the associations of both parties negotiated several agreements. The ﬁrst
agreement, VV I, came into eﬀect in May 1998, followed by the second agreement, VV
II, in January 2000. The ﬁrst validity period of the ﬁnal agreement, VV II+, in eﬀect
from January 2002, ended in December 2003. In May 2003 it was accepted by law (1(st)
amendment to EnWG) as the general code of practice. The second period of VV II+
ended in July 2005. In addition to NTPA and its associations´ agreement the German
cartel oﬃces (Bundeskartellamt and Landeskartellamt) had had the possibility to control
network access ex post, especially to secure non-discriminatory access. Consequently,
Meran and von Hirschhausen (2004, 1) have described the German way of energy regu-
lation as ”cartel type, private contracts negotiated between the main domestic players in
the industry, accompanied by weak ex-post control exercised by anti-monopoly agency”.
In June 2003, the EU acceleration directive demanded the installation of regulation au-
thorities in all member states by July 2004. One year later, in July 2005, the German
legislator implemented the directive by the second amendment to EnWG. NTPA was re-
placed by RTPA, and the federal network agency (Bundesnetzagentur) was appointed as
the new federal regulatory authority. Table 4 represents the regulatory framework and
chronological sequence in detail.
5Table 4: NTPA in Germany
Date Description Content Actors
04/1998 Reform of
energy law
Legal opening of electricity and gas
markets for all customers; negotiated
third party access (law on electricity







Access charges, calculated on the




association of large industrial
electricity consumers (VIK)
Network owners: association of
electricity economy (VdEW)






Access charges based on connection
points; two geographical zones
Network users: see above
Network owners: see above








General terms of contracts, principles of
the calculation of access charges market
comparison scheme
Network users: see above,
Network owners: see above +
association of grid operators




task force of Federal Ministry
of Economics
01/2002 – 12/2003 First validity period of VV II+
05/2003 VV II+ =
general code
of pratice
1. amendment to EnWG: VV II+
accepted by law as the general code of
practice without constraining the




European Union: Duty to introduce
regulation authority in all member
states,“German way of regulation” has
to be ﬁnished until 07/2004
European legislator





2. amendment to EnWG: Introduction
of regulation authorities (federal
network agency and federal states
regulation agencies); introduction of
legal rules; preparing of incentive
regulation
Federal legislator
07/2005 VV II+ as important background for decisions of federal network agency
Source: Glachant, Dubois and Perez (2004), Monitoring-Report (2003), Federal Ministry of Economic
Aﬀairs (2006a, 2006b), Federal network agency (2006).
63 Theoretical Background
The main aspects of electricity market regulation are the securing of non-discriminatory
network access and the prevention of monopoly network access charges. Considering
the very complex market structure, including various cost relevant interconnections be-
tween the non-contestable and potential competitive production stages, the determina-
tion of an adequate pricing rule for network access charges is a rather sophisticated task.
Whereas economic theory oﬀers a variety of diﬀerent pricing rules (e.g., (long run) av-
erage incremental cost prices, eﬃcient component price rules or Ramsey-prices (Baumol
and Sidak 1994, Sidak and Spulber 1997, pp. 403-426), it cannot give a deﬁnite answer.
NTPA, as one possible solution to this problem, seems to be inappropriate. The observed
price turbulence and diﬀerences in the price setting behavior show that a stable equilib-
rium with prices equalling long-run average costs was not achieved. Various reasons are
responsible for that failure.
First of all, it can be assumed that the so-called regulatory threat, which refers to
the power of the cartel oﬃces to control the access charges (Brunekreeft 2001, 2002), had
an inﬂuence on the price setting diﬀerences. The behavior of large vertically integrated
network operators - active in the low-, medium- and high-voltage section - is assumed to
be under more public scrutiny and hence under a more intense control of the cartel oﬃces
than the behavior of the much smaller - not vertically integrated - utilities. Therefore,
the integrated operators could have decreased their access charges more than the non-
integrated utilities. On the other hand, the regulatory threat could have become ineﬀective
towards the end of NTPA. The end of NTPA was already foreseeable during 2003. Hence,
the incentive to decrease prices became weaker after the ﬁrst quarter of 2003. It might be
even possible that operators raised their prices expecting the inoperativeness of NTPA.
A second reason for price setting turbulence could be that in the pre-deregulation
period access charge calculation had not been necessary. It is conceivable that the calcu-
lation knowledge had been unevenly distributed. Large integrated ﬁrms active in several
markets and sections had better knowledge than small ﬁrms operating only in one local
market. In other words, integrated ﬁrms had more experience with optimal price calcu-
lation and therefore would change their prices less frequently. When combined with the
above-mentioned more intense control, either constant or decreasing prices are assumed
for these ﬁrms.
Another possible explanation could be the strategic use of structural characteristics.
At the end of 2001 a market comparison scheme has been introduced as a part of the ﬁnal
association agreement, VV II+. It developed three so-called structural features (Struk-
turmerkmale) that were intended to account for diﬀerences in the networks. Network
suppliers which
• are located in East Germany,
7• can be characterized by low possibilities to secure economies of scale (low population
or consumption density), or
• are obligated to bear additional social costs (high cable rates because of ecological
or aesthetical reasons)
obtained the ”right” to levy higher access charges by the institutional rules of the market
comparison scheme. If ﬁrms that fulﬁlled these features recognized that they were charging
lower access charges than they were allowed to, they were invited to mark up their fees
(Wein 2005).
Finally, the obligation to publish speciﬁc access charges and structural features - also
introduced with the comparison scheme - might have had an inﬂuence on the price setting
behavior as well. Firms that had charged relatively low access charges were informed that
they were able to increase prices without fear of regulation (Growitsch and Wein 2005). On
the other hand, relatively expensive ﬁrms were informed that they should fear regulation.
The eﬀect should be a price reduction of expensive operators and a price increase of cheap
operators.
Recapitulating, several theoretical arguments can be enumerated why price changes
could have occurred in both directions:
• Asymmetric inﬂuence of regulatory threat depending on ﬁrm size and the expected
ending of NTPA .
• Diﬀerences in price calculation knowledge between vertically integrated and non-
integrated operators.
• Strategic use of structural features inviting operators with high cost structural fea-
tures to increase their charges.
• Publishing obligation of access charges oﬀering information on access charges of all
operators.
4 Data, Hypothesis, and Methodology
The market comparison scheme, which was constituted by the last association agreement
at the end of 2001, required network operators to publish network access charges. The
German association of electricity network operators collected and published the data of
all its member ﬁrms that were active in low-, medium- or high-voltage (VDN 2006).







Access charges to the low-voltage networks are registered for customers with power me-
tering as well as customers without power metering, and at the medium- and high-voltage
networks for customers with power metering only. In each network section, the charges are
diﬀerentiated in terms of characteristic consumption classes; for example, for low-voltage
without power metering between 1.700, 3.500 and 30.000 kWh/a, and for medium-voltage
between 1.600, 2.500 and 5.000 utilization h/a (Katzefey et al. 2002). Furthermore, the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc arithmetic mean values of the charges are published, separated for the low-,
medium- and high-voltage networks.
In accordance to the market comparison scheme, the data of VDN also include ﬁrm-
speciﬁc information on the following structural features:
• Structural feature number 1 measures the regional intensity of demand. Regarding
the low-voltage network, the population density (inhabitants per sqkm) is used.
Low population density (D) means below 2.500 inh./sqkm, medium is below 3.500
inh./sqkm and high is above 3.500 inh./sqkm. To avoid contortions, areas without
low-voltage supply (forests, lakes, etc.) are not included. The consumption density
(MWh/sqkm) takes into account the current ﬂows in medium- and high-voltage
networks in relation to the entire area of the network. This feature is applied to the
whole area because unpopulated territories in these networks cannot be excluded
technically (Katzefey et al. 2002). Consumption density (D) in medium-voltage
(high voltage) is classiﬁed as low if MWh/sqkm are below 500 (5.500), medium is
below 1.700 (15.000) MWh/sqkm, and high is above 1.700 (15.000) MWh/sqkm.
• The second structural feature, ”cable rate” (CR), measures the cable length in
comparison to the whole length of the respective network’s conductions. This struc-
tural feature is supposed to represent the fact that network operators are frequently
obliged (for aesthetical and environmental reasons) to use underground lines. The
associations agreed on three classes of CR ≤ 50 percent), medium (50 percent <
CR ≤ 75 percent), and high (CR > 75 percent).
• The third structural feature includes the fragmentation of network suppliers due to
their service areas: East Germany and West Germany. It represents the consider-
ation that oversized networks have been established in East Germany after 1989.
The over-sizing eﬀects are the result of not forecasting the diminishing peak load
quantity (around 70 percent) after the reuniﬁcation (stranded costs).
Table 5 reports the percentage distribution of the ﬁrms within each structural feature
based on the data of April 2005. At that time, almost all network operators had reported
their structural variables, and for almost all ﬁrms the classiﬁcation has not changed since
October 2002 (VDN 2006).
Additionally, in order to analyze the inﬂuence of diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes and ﬁrm structures
on the development of access charges, we diﬀerentiate the ﬁrms by their degree of vertical
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West Germany: 81.4 (579 ﬁrms)
East Germany: 18.6 (132 ﬁrms)
integration. If a ﬁrm has not reported an access charge for the high-voltage section, we
assume this ﬁrm is not active in the high-voltage section. Hence, no vertical integration
is given. Accordingly, ﬁrms active in the high-voltage section are identiﬁed as being
vertically integrated. Table 6 shows the number and percentage of ﬁrms considered as
vertically integrated and not vertically integrated.
Table 6: Vertical integration
No Yes All
Active in high voltage
section?
659 52 711
(92.7 percent) (7.3 percent) (100.0 percent)
Finally, considering the inﬂuence of publishing obligations, we classify ﬁrms as expen-
sive if their average access charges fall in the upper thirty percent of the voltage section.
This frontier is chosen in relation to the market comparison scheme. The diﬀerence be-
tween the frontier deﬁned by the market comparison scheme and our frontier is that we
do not use a speciﬁc thirty percent frontier for every structural class within each voltage
section. These classes were developed by the market comparison scheme to diﬀerenti-
ate the ﬁrms by their structural features. By combining the three diﬀerent categories
(low, medium, and high) of the ﬁrst two structural features with the two categories (east
and west) of the third feature eighteen structural classes for each voltage section were
generated. Every ﬁrm belonged to one class, and the upper thirty percent frontier of
the average access charges was used to identify ﬁrms under suspicion of being expensive.
Hence, these ﬁrms had to fear an arbitration board proceeding, with the board examining
10the ﬁrms‘ cost calculations under the criterion of reasonableness. Since some classes only
include one or two ﬁrms we do not use this class-speciﬁc frontier but deﬁne an overall
frontier for the whole voltage section. In the same manner, we classify a ﬁrm as cheap if
the ﬁrm‘s average access charges belong to the lower thirty percent of the voltage section.
To measure the development of access charges depending on the described variables
we calculate the growth rate of access charges:
access charget − access charget−1
access charget−1
· 100. (2)
Furthermore, as shown in Table 7, we analyze the inﬂuence of time by considering diﬀerent
time periods. For example, choosing October 2002 as the base point, we calculate the
growth rate of half a year until May 2003, one year until October 2003, and so on. Based
on the starting point, the very short perspective of one-half a year can be analyzed ﬁve
times and the very long perspective of two and a half years only once.
Table 7: Inﬂuence of time
Ending point in time


















According to the theoretical background the following hypotheses can be derived:
• For large vertically integrated ﬁrms we would expect negative growth rates. These
ﬁrms set lower access charges because they are probably more aﬀected by regulatory
threat. Furthermore they could have better calculation knowledge than relatively
small non-integrated ﬁrms, leading to lower growth rates.
• In Spring of 2003 the foreseeable end of NTPA lowered the incentive to decrease
prices. Hence, positively inﬂuenced growth rates in 2004/05 could be expected.
• Since the market comparison scheme allows ﬁrms located in East Germany, charac-
terized by low population/consumption density, and/or ﬁrms with a high cable rate
to levy higher access charges, this could work as an invitation to increase prices.
Therefore, the growth rates should be positively inﬂuenced.
11• In September 2002 the publishing obligation of access charges revealed information
on other operators´ prices. Since then expensive ﬁrms - access charges in the upper
30 percent of the voltage section - must fear regulation. An incentive to cut prices
was raised, and we would expect negative growth rates. According to this, cheap
ﬁrms - access charges in the lower 30 percent of the voltage section – had an incentive
to increase their prices. Hence, positive growth rates would be expected.
Table 8 summarizes the relevant variables and the hypotheses.
Table 8: Explaining variables and hypotheses
Growth rate
Integrated (active in high-voltage, yes=1, other=0) –
Short ”life” time for NTPA expected +
East Germany (East=1, West=0) +
Lower density (D; Inh. per sqkm/MWh per sqkm) +
Higher cable rate (CR; 0 ≤ CR ≤ 1) +
Expensive in t-1 (yes=1, other=0) –
Cheap in t-1 (yes=1, other=0) +
5 Descriptive Analysis
Descriptive information on the average access charges for the low-, medium- and high-
voltage levels are represented in Table 9. First, it is shown that the access charges decrease
from the low-voltage to the high-voltage level. The mean values in low- and medium-
voltage are lower in March 2003 than in October 2002, and after March 2003 they remain
relatively stable. The mean values for the high-voltage level have systematically increased
since October 2002. In all voltage levels, the standard deviation value is lower in March
2003 than in October 2002, indicating that the variance has decreased. After March
2003, the standard deviation remains relatively stable in all voltage levels. Referring to
the minimum and maximum values, the observed changes should be carefully interpreted,
since in the ﬁrst period not all German operators disclosed their access charges. In contrast
to a rather slight change of the access charges from October 2002 to March 2003 within
the ’cheap’-mark (30%-mark), the values within the ’expensive’-mark (70%-mark) show a
dramatic change for the same period. Altogether, the descriptive analysis indicates that
the period from October 2002 to March 2003 is of most interest, especially for the low-
and medium-voltage level.











10/02 5.55 5.49 0.64 2.87 8.15 5.17 5.85 484
03/03 5.49 5.40 0.58 4.11 7.67 5.15 5.76 507
10/03 5.47 5.39 0.58 3.11 7.77 5.15 5.71 659
04/04 5.47 5.38 0.57 3.11 7.77 5.15 5.71 664
10/04 5.47 5.40 0.58 3.11 7.77 5.16 5.70 671
04/05 5.46 5.39 0.58 3.11 7.77 5.15 5.71 667
Medium-voltage
10/02 2.80 2.73 0.46 1.54 5.11 2.53 3.00 468
03/03 2.76 2.70 0.38 1.93 4.28 2.52 2.96 484
10/03 2.74 2.68 0.37 1.93 4.28 2.52 2.92 622
04/04 2.74 2.68 0.37 1.93 4.28 2.52 2.92 625
10/04 2.75 2.69 0.35 1.93 4.28 2.52 2.92 627
04/05 2.76 2.70 0.38 1.93 5.54 2.53 2.94 631
High-voltage
10/02 1.23 1.18 0.18 0.88 1.70 1.11 1.32 44
03/03 1.22 1.19 0.16 0.88 1.59 1.10 1.26 41
10/03 1.23 1.20 0.15 0.98 1.59 1.13 1.30 40
04/04 1.25 1.24 0.14 0.98 1.59 1.16 1.34 36
10/04 1.25 1.25 0.14 0.98 1.59 1.17 1.33 37
04/05 1.29 1.27 0.15 0.98 1.66 1.19 1.35 36
1 charges without metering, chp (combined heat and power cycle) shares, mark up for synthetic load
proﬁle, and concession fees.
Table 10 displays the percentages of ﬁrms with negative and positive growth rates of
access charges depending on the time perspective and voltage level. Considering the very
long run (2.5 years) we are able to evaluate the total eﬀect. Almost one-half of the low-
(48.3 percent) and medium-voltage ﬁrms (45.2 percent) decreased their access charges,
while nearly three-quarters (71.4 percent) of the high-voltage ﬁrms increased their access
charges. This trend is observable within the other time perspectives with a baseline of
13October 2002 as well. Additionally, referring to the very short perspective it is seen that
the main price changes occurred either in the ﬁrst period from October 2002 to March
2003 or in the last two periods from April 2004 to October 2004 and October 2004 to
April 2005. Between these periods a relatively small percentage of ﬁrms changed prices.
Table 10: Percentages of ﬁrms with negative and positive growth rates of access charges
Low-voltage Medium-voltage High-voltage
– + n* – + n* – + n*
Very long run (2.5 years)
10/02 – 04/05 48.3 30.9 447 45.2 35.7 434 14.3 71.4 28
Long run (2.0 years)
10/02 – 10/04 48.2 33.8 452 45.6 32.1 430 20.7 62.1 29
03/03 – 04/05 20.1 18.3 497 18.9 26.9 472 6.1 51.5 33
Medium run (1.5 years)
10/02 – 04/04 46.1 29.1 447 42.1 30.9 430 25.0 57.1 28
03/03 – 10/04 22.5 27.6 497 16.5 17.4 472 9.1 27.3 33
10/03 – 04/05 14.9 15.0 653 15.6 22.8 615 5.7 48.6 35
Short run (1.0 year)
10/02 – 10/03 45.9 26.8 447 39.9 29.2 431 24.2 45.5 33
03/03 – 04/04 9.1 7.6 497 7.8 7.6 473 9.1 21.2 33
10/03 – 10/04 18.1 23.1 653 12.4 14.5 615 8.6 22.9 35
04/04 – 04/05 11.0 10.6 661 12.9 19.3 622 0.0 33.3 36
Very short run (0.5 year)
10/02 – 03/03 41.5 27.4 383 38.9 26.5 370 25.0 38.9 36
03/03 – 10/03 3.8 2.8 501 2.5 2.5 477 0.0 2.6 38
10/03 – 04/04 4.4 4.7 654 4.4 4.4 617 8.6 17.1 35
04/04 – 10/04 14.8 20.1 662 8.2 10.1 621 0.0 5.6 36
10/04 – 04/05 12.0 6.6 665 6.6 12.0 625 0.0 30.6 36
* number of observations.
6 Multivariate Analysis
Table 11 represents an overview on the estimated models. Since the growth rates which
are used as left hand variables can range form -∞ to +∞, the Ordinary-Least-Square-
(OLS)-method is applied (see for example Gujarati 1995, Hill, Griﬃths and Judge 1997).
14We carry out normality tests after Jarque-Bera and homoscedasticity-tests after White
to check for important assumptions of the OLS-method (Greene 1997, Gujarati 1995,
Kawakatsu 1998). Since the number of ﬁrms active in the high-voltage sector is too low,
multivariate estimations have to be constrained to the low- and medium-voltage sectors
(see Table 9). Furthermore, models with a starting point later than October 2002 exhibit
a very low explanation power (low or negative R2) and/or have to be excluded because
of too few observations. This limits our multivariate analysis to the econometric feasible
models with the starting point of October 2002. Since the results vary only slightly with
the time perspective it is suﬃcient to present the models 1+2 (very long run) and 29+30
(very short run). All other models can be found in the appendix.
Table 11: Estimated models
Ending point in time


































The estimation results for the very short run perspective from October 2002 until
March 2003 are reproduced in Table 12. For the low-voltage sector (model 29) it is
shown that ﬁrms located in East Germany when compared to ﬁrms located in West
Germany have signiﬁcantly (one percent level) increased their access charges by more
than three percent. Therefore, the hypothesis of invitation seems to be correct: The fact
of working in East Germany and hence having the allowance to charge higher prices -
which was given by the market comparison scheme - created incentives to charge higher
network prices. The consumption density variables point in the same direction. Firms
assigned a low (medium) population density increased their access charges by 1.7 (1.3)
percent. The coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant on the ﬁve percent level and 10 percent level
respectively. In contrast, the variables for the structural feature ”cable rate” do not show
the expected sign: high cable rates are accepted as a reason to charge higher prices by
the market comparison scheme, but low and medium cable rate operators signiﬁcantly
increased their prices between October 2002 and March 2003. However, given a relatively
15high error probability (signiﬁcant on the ten percent level) the eﬀect remains critical.
The variable for vertically integrated ﬁrms (active in high-voltage) is not signiﬁcant.
These ﬁrms did not decrease their charges as expected.
Operators that had been expensive in October 2002 signiﬁcantly (one percent level)
lowered their prices by nearly four percent. Hence, the hypothesis of a strong inﬂuence of
regulatory threat cannot be rejected. In relation to this, operators with relatively cheap
access charges in October 2002 signiﬁcantly (one percent level) increased their prices by
nearly four percent. Therefore the hypothesis that the publishing obligation of access
charges invited these ﬁrms to increase their prices seems to be correct as well. Overall, all
low-voltage network operators decreased their access charges by more than three percent
between October 2002 and March 2003 (signiﬁcant on the one percent level). Hence, a
”correct” inﬂuence of regulatory threat can be assumed.
The model is able to explain 17.8 percent of the variance. Further, it is highly signiﬁ-
cant, and the test of homoscedasticity indicates no problems. The assumption of normally
distributed residuals has to be rejected, but normal distribution can be assumed because
377 ﬁrms are included.
Model 30 describes the estimation made for the medium-voltage section. As in the
previous model, a strong inﬂuence of East Germany as the ﬁrm´s location is given: East
German medium-voltage operators increased their prices by more than ﬁve percent com-
pared to operators located in West Germany (signiﬁcant on the one percent level). Con-
sumption density had no inﬂuence. Operators characterized by a medium cable rate
signiﬁcantly increased their prices by more than three percent (ﬁve percent level) which
does not ﬁt to our hypothesis. Vertical integration had no inﬂuence. As in the low-voltage
section, expensive ﬁrms in October 2002 seemed to have been aﬀected by regulatory threat
and therefore cut prices by more than ﬁve percent (signiﬁcant on the one percent level).
Cheap ﬁrms signiﬁcantly increased their prices by almost ﬁve percent (one percent level).
Altogether, all operators cut their prices approximately three percent (signiﬁcant on the
one percent level). As for the low-voltage section, the inﬂuence of regulatory threat seems
to be correct. The goodness of ﬁt of this model does not vary from the previous one.
Table 13 presents the estimations for the very long run perspective with the starting
point of October 2002, and because most variables and goodness of ﬁt criteria show the
same results as the two previous models it is not necessary to discuss all results. Compared
to the very short run perspective, the variables of low population density and cable rate
in the low-voltage section show a higher signiﬁcance. Low population density and low
cable rate are signiﬁcant on the one percent level, and medium cable rate is signiﬁcant
on the ﬁve percent level. However, as discussed before, the direction of the cable rate
variables was unexpected. Furthermore, all low-voltage operators signiﬁcantly decreased
their prices by more than 3.5 percent until May 2005 (one percent level). This value is
higher than the value for the very short run perspective, indicating an ongoing decrease of
access charges in the very long run. This contradicts the hypothesis of regulatory threat
16becoming ineﬀective towards the end of NTPA.
The estimation results of the medium-voltage section in the very long run perspective
(model 2) are identical to the very short run perspective. The only diﬀerence is that
the constant variable is not signiﬁcant. Hence, the overall development of access charges
remains unsure.























low (MWh < 500 = 1)
– 0.824
(0.520)


























































Estimation method OLS OLS
Signiﬁcant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t-values in parentheses. 2 Ha
0: null hypothesis
could be rejected; Hna
0 : null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses.
Source: Data set “Deregulated German electricity market 2006”; estimated with “EViews 5.1”.























low (MWh < 500 = 1)
– 0.971
(0.581)


























































Estimation method OLS3 OLS
Signiﬁcant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t-values in parentheses. 2 Ha
0: null hypothesis
could be rejected; Hna
0 : null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses.3 Heteroscedastie-
consistent-OLS-Estimation after White.
Source: Data set “Deregulated German electricity market 2006”; estimated with “EViews 5.1”.
197 Conclusions
At the end of 2001, the ﬁnal association agreement was established in which a market
comparison scheme was a rigorous part. The aim of the market comparison scheme was to
regulate the bottleneck of the electricity sector: that is, the access charges to electricity
grids. Analyzing the dynamics of access charges from 2002 to 2005 reveals that many
network operators changed their prices in this period. Some of them cut prices, some of
them raised prices and a variety of ﬁrms changed their prices in both directions. From
an economic point of view this behavior is quite unusual. The expectation would be
either regulated average cost prices or monopoly prices, depending on the eﬀectiveness or
ineﬀectiveness of NTPA. Furthermore, prices should remain stable from the beginning of
NTPA since there are little arguments for cost changes or demand variations afterwards.
Nevertheless, several other factors, apart from the basic regulatory scheme, could be
responsible for the observed price setting turbulence: asymmetric inﬂuence of regulatory
threat depending on ﬁrm size and time, diﬀerent cost and price calculation knowledge,
strategic use of structural features and the obligation to publish speciﬁc access charges.
Using multivariate estimations, we tested these hypotheses and derived the following
results:
• The hypotheses of asymmetric inﬂuence of regulatory threat and diﬀerences in the
price calculation knowledge cannot be conﬁrmed. Large vertically integrated ﬁrms
did not show a signiﬁcant divergence in their price setting behavior compared to
small non-integrated ﬁrms. Furthermore, the overall decrease of access charges be-
ing higher in the very long run perspective than in the very short run perspective
contradicts the hypothesis of regulatory threat becoming ineﬀective towards the end
of NTPA.
• The hypothesis of strategic use of structural features is conﬁrmed for two of the three
structural features. Operators located in East Germany, as well as operators with
a low or medium population/consumption density, increased their access charges in
the short and the long run. Therefore, the assumption that these features worked
as an invitation to increase prices seems to be correct. However, we are not able to
conﬁrm this for the third structural feature of cable rate.
• The hypothesis that the publishing obligation of access charges inﬂuenced the price
setting behavior seems to be correct as well. Expensive ﬁrms decreased their prices.
Hence, they were presumably aﬀected by regulatory threat. Additionally, cheap
ﬁrms increased their prices, indicating that the information of the other operators´
prices set incentives to adopt that price level.
In addition to these estimation results, the descriptive statistics reveal that it was from
October 2002 to March 2003 that most price changes occurred. The majority of low and
medium network operators decreased their prices in the short as well as in the long run.
Supported by our estimations, this implicates that regulatory threat played an important
20role in the low- and medium-voltage section.
A few shortcomings of our work should be mentioned. First, a lot of variance (more
than two-thirds ) could not be explained with the multivariate estimations. Additionally
we also found some unintended reactions that increased access charges. More data in
terms of ﬁrm-speciﬁc data and data on the institutional environment of the market are
needed to examine these reactions in more detail. Finally, due to only a few observations
of high-voltage operators, we were not able to examine the price setting behavior in this
sector. Since the descriptive statistics reveal that a majority of the operators increased
their prices in the short as well as in the long run, it would be of great interest to know
which factors are responsible for this.
Finally, from the viewpoint of economic policy it seems that the ﬁnal association
agreement of NTPA partly worked in the sense of regulating the access prices of electricity
grids. On the other hand, the results show that other factors - more or less connected to
the regulatory design - inﬂuence the price setting behavior, too. Therefore, our results
deliver important hints as to which additional factors should be considered for the new
incentive regulation.
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23Appendix
Table A - 1: Growth rates of average network access charges – long run perspective























































































































N 484 458 445 425
























Estimation method OLS3 OLS OLS3 OLS
Signiﬁcant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t-values in parentheses. 2 Ha
0: null hypothesis
could be rejected; Hna
0 : null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses.3 Heteroscedastie-
consistent-OLS-Estimation after White.
Source: Data set “Deregulated German electricity market 2006”; estimated with “EViews 5.1”.
24Table A - 2: Growth rates of average network access charges – medium run perspective























































































































N 632 592 484 458
























Estimation method OLS3 OLS OLS3 OLS
Signiﬁcant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t-values in parentheses. 2 Ha
0: null hypothesis
could be rejected; Hna
0 : null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses.3 Heteroscedastie-
consistent-OLS-Estimation after White.
Source: Data set “Deregulated German electricity market 2006”; estimated with “EViews 5.1”.























low (MWh < 500 = 1)
– 0.980
(0.694)


























































Estimation method OLS3 OLS
Signiﬁcant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t-values in parentheses. 2 Ha
0: null hypothesis
could be rejected; Hna
0 : null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses.3 Heteroscedastie-
consistent-OLS-Estimation after White.
Source: Data set “Deregulated German electricity market 2006”; estimated with “EViews 5.1”.
26Table A - 4: Growth rates of average network access charges – short run perspective























































































































N 639 598 632 592
























Estimation method OLS3 OLS OLS OLS
Signiﬁcant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t-values in parentheses. 2 Ha
0: null hypothesis
could be rejected; Hna
0 : null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses.3 Heteroscedastie-
consistent-OLS-Estimation after White.
Source: Data set “Deregulated German electricity market 2006”; estimated with “EViews 5.1”.
27Table A - 5: Growth rates of average network access charges – short run perspective























































































































N 484 459 440 426
























Estimation method OLS3 OLS3 OLS3 OLS
Signiﬁcant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t-values in parentheses. 2 Ha
0: null hypothesis
could be rejected; Hna
0 : null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses.3 Heteroscedastie-
consistent-OLS-Estimation after White.
Source: Data set “Deregulated German electricity market 2006”; estimated with “EViews 5.1”.
28Table A - 6: Growth rates of average network access charges – very short run perspective























































































































N 643 601 640 597
























Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS3
Signiﬁcant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t-values in parentheses. 2 Ha
0: null hypothesis
could be rejected; Hna
0 : null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses.3 Heteroscedastie-
consistent-OLS-Estimation after White.
Source: Data set “Deregulated German electricity market 2006”; estimated with “EViews 5.1”.
29Table A - 7: Growth rates of average network access charges – very short run perspective























































































































N 633 594 487 463
























Estimation method OLS OLS3 OLS3 OLS
Signiﬁcant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***;
t-values in parentheses. 2 Ha
0: null hypothesis could be rejected; Hna
0 : null hypothesis could not be
rejected; p-values in parentheses.3 Heteroscedastie-consistent-OLS-Estimation after White.
Source: Data set “Deregulated German electricity market 2006”; estimated with “EViews 5.1”.
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